We study fair allocation of indivisible goods to agents with unequal entitlements. Fair allocation has been the subject of many studies in both divisible and indivisible settings. Our emphasis is on the case where the goods are indivisible and agents have unequal entitlements. This problem is a generalization of the work by Procaccia and Wang [16] wherein the agents are assumed to be symmetric with respect to their entitlements. Although Procaccia and Wang show an almost fair (constant approximation) allocation exists in their setting, our main result is in sharp contrast to their observation. We show that, in some cases with n agents, no allocation can guarantee better than 1/n approximation of a fair allocation when the entitlements are not necessarily equal. Furthermore, we devise a simple algorithm that ensures a 1/n approximation guarantee.
INTRODUCTION
In this work, we conduct a study of fairly allocating indivisible goods among n agents with unequal claims on the goods. Fair allocation is a very fundamental problem that has received attention in both Computer Science and Economics. This problem dates back to 1948 when Steinhaus [19] introduced the cake cutting problem as follows: given n agents with different valuation functions for a cake, is it possible to divide the cake between them in such a way that every agent receives a piece whose value to him is at least 1/n of the whole cake? Steinhaus answered this question in the affirmative by proposing a simple and elegant algorithm which is called moving knife. Although this problem admits a straightforward solution, several ramifications of the cake cutting problem have been studied since then, many of which have not been settled after decades [4, 17, 8, 15, 11, 9, 20, 7] . For instance, a natural generalization of the problem in which we discriminate the agents based on their entitlements is still open. In this problem, every agent claims an entitlement ei to the cake such that ei = 1, and the goal is to cut the cake into disproportional pieces and allocate them to the agents such that every agent ai's valuation for his piece is at least ei fraction of his valuation for the entire cake. For two agents, Brams et al. [3] showed that at least two cuts are necessary to divide the cake between the agents. Furthermore, Robertson et al. [18] proposed a modified version of cut and choose method to divide the cake between two agents with portions e1, e2, where e1 and e2 are real numbers. McAvaney, Robertson, and Web [14] considered the case when the entitlements are rational numbers. They used Ramsey partitions to show that when the entitlements are rational, one can make a proper division via O(n 3 ) cuts.
Recently, a new line of research is focused on the fair allocation of indivisible goods. In contrast to the conventional cake cutting problem, in this problem instead of a heterogeneous cake, we have a set M of indivisible goods and we wish to distribute them among n agents. Indeed, due to trivial counterexamples in this setting 1 , the previous guar-antee, that is every agent should obtain 1/n of his valuation for all items from his allocated set, is impossible to deliver. To alleviate this problem, Budish [5] proposed a concept of fairness for the allocation of indivisible goods namely the maxmin share. Suppose we ask an agent ai to divide the items between the agents in a way that he thinks is fair to everybody. Of course, agent ai does not take into account other agents' valuations and only incorporates his valuation function in the allocation. Based on this, we define MMSi equal to the minimum profit that any agent receives in this allocation, according to agent ai's valuation function. Obviously, in order to maximize MMSi, agent ai chooses an allocation that maximizes the minimum profit of the agents. We call an allocation fair (approximately fair), if every agent ai receives a set of items that is worth at least MMSi (a fraction of MMSi) to him.
It is easy to see that MMSi is the best possible guarantee that one can hope to obtain in this setting. If all agents have the same valuation function, then at least one of the agents receives a collection of items that are worth no more than MMSi to him. A natural question that emerges here is whether a fair allocation with respect to MMSi's is always possible? Although the experiments are in favor of this conjecture, Procaccia and Wang [16] (EC'14) refuted this by an elegant and delicate counterexample. They show such a fair allocation is impossible in some cases, even when the number of agents is limited to 3. On the positive side however, they show an approximately fair allocation can be guaranteed. More precisely, they show that there always exists an allocation in which every agent's profit is at least 2/3MMSi. Such an allocation is called a 2/3-MMS allocation. Amanatidis, Markakis, Nikzad, and Saberi [1] later provided a proof for the existence of an MMS allocation for the case, when there are large enough items and the value of each agent for every items is drawn independently from a uniform distribution. A generalized form of this result was later proposed by Kurokawa et al. [13] for arbitrary distributions. In a recent work, Caragiannis et al. [6] proved that the maximum Nash welfare (MNW) solution, which selects an allocation that maximizes the product of utilities, for each agent guarantees a 2/(1 + √ 4n − 3) fraction of her MMS. Although it is natural to assume the agents have equal entitlements on the items, in most real-world applications, agents have unequal entitlements on the goods. For instance, in various religions, cultures, and regulations, the distribution of the inherited wealth is often unequal. Furthermore, the division of mineral resources of a land or international waters between the neighboring countries is often made unequally based on the geographic, economic, and political status of the countries.
For fairly allocating indivisible items to agents with different entitlements, two procedures are proposed in [4] . The first one is based on Knaster's procedure of sealed bids. In this method, we have an auction for selling each item. Therefore, for using it all the agents should have an adequate reserve of money which is the main issue of the procedure. The second procedure mentioned in [4] is based on method of markers developed by William F. Lucas which is spiritually similar to the moving knife procedure. In this method, first we line up the items, and then the agents place some markers for dividing the items. This method suffers from high dependency of its final allocation to the order of the items in the line. Agent duplication is another idea to deal with unequal entitlements. More precisely, when all of the entitlements are fractional numbers, we can duplicate each agent ai to some agents with similar valuation functions to ai. The goal of this duplication is to reduce the problem to the case of equal entitlements. After the allocation, every agent ai owns all of the allocated items to her duplicated agents. For instance, assume that we have three agents with entitlements 1/2, 2/5, and 1/10, respectively. In this case, we duplicate the first agent to five agents and the second agent to four agents each having an entitlement of 1/10. This way, we can reduce our problem to the case of equal entitlements. Although agent duplication may be practical when the items are divisible, in the indivisible case, this method does not apply to the indivisible setting. For instance, if the number of the agents is higher than the number of available items, we cannot allocate anything to some agents. Another issue with this method is that it works only for fractional entitlements.
In this paper, we study fair allocation of indivisible items with different entitlements using a model which resolves the mentioned issues. Our fairness criterion mimics the general idea of Budish for defining maxmin shares. Similar to Budish's proposal, in order to define a maxmin share for an agent ai, we ask the following question: how much benefit does agent ai expect to receive from a fair allocation, if we were to divide the goods only based on his valuation function? If agent ai expects to receive a profit of p from the allocation, then he should also recognize a minimum profit of p · ej/ei for any other agent aj, so that his own profit per entitlement is a lower bound for all agents. Therefore, a fair answer to this question is the maximum value of p for which there exists an allocation such that agent ai's profit-per-entitlement can be guaranteed to all other agents (according to his own valuation function). We define the maxmin shares of the agents based on this intuition.
Recall that we denote the number of agents with n and the entitlement of every agent ai with ei. We assume the entitlements always add up to 1. For every agent ai, we define the weighted maxmin share denote by WMMSi, to be the highest value of p for which there exists an allocation of the goods to the agents in which every agent aj receives a profit of at least p · ej /ei based on agent ai's valuation function. Similarly, we call an allocation α-WMMS, if every agent ai obtains an α fraction of WMMSi from his allocated goods. Notice that in case ei = 1/n for all agents, this definition is identical to Budish's definition. Since our model is a generalization of the Budish's model, it is known that a fair allocation is not guaranteed to exist for every scenario. However, whether a 2/3 approximation or in general a constant approximation WMMS allocation exists remains an open question.
Our main result is in contrast to that of Procaccia and Wang. We settle the above question by giving a 1/n hardness result for this problem. In other words, we show no algorithm can guarantee any allocation which is better than 1/n-WMMS in general. We further complement this result by providing a simple algorithm that guarantees a 1/n-WMMS allocation to all agents. As we show in Section 2, this hardness is a direct consequence of unreasonably high valuation of agents with low entitlements for some items. Moreover, in Section 3 we discuss that not only are such valuation functions unrealistic, but also an agent with such a valuation function has an incentive to misrepresent his valuations (Observation 3.1). Therefore, a natural limitation that one can add to the setting is to assume no item is worth more than WMMSi for any agent ai. We also study the problem in this mildly restricted setting and show in this case a 1/2-WMMS guarantee can be delivered via a greedy algorithm.
In contrast to our theoretical results, we show in practice a fair allocation is likely to exist by providing experimental results on real-world data. The source of our experiments is a publicly available collection of bids for eBay goods and services 2 . Note that since those auctions are truthful 3 , it is the users' best interest to bid their actual valuations for the items and thus the market is transparent. More details about the experiments can be found in Section 4. We also support our claim by presenting theoretical analysis for the stochastic variants of the problem in which the valuation of every agent for a good is drawn from a given distribution.
Our Model
Let N be a set of n agents, and M be a set of m items. Each agent ai has an additive valuation function Vi for the items. In addition, every agent ai has an entitlement to the items, namely ei. The entitlements add up to 1, i.e., ei = 1.
Since our model is a generalization of maxmin share, we begin with a formal definition of the maxmin shares for equal entitlements, proposed by Budish [5] . In this case, we assume all of the entitlements are equal to 1/n. Let Π(M) be the set of n-partitionings of the items. Define the maxmin share of agent ai (MMSi) of player i as
Vi(Aj).
One can interpret the maxmin share of an agent as his outcome as a divider in a divide-and-choose procedure against adversaries [5] . Consider a situation that a cautious agent knows his own valuation on the items, but the valuations of other agents are unknown to him. If we ask the agent to run a divide-and-choose procedure, he tries to split the items in a way that the least valuable bundle is as attractive as possible. When the agents have different entitlements, the above interpretation is no longer valid. The problem is that the agents have different entitlements and this discrepancy must somehow be considered in the divide-and-choose procedure. Thus, we need an interpretation of the maxmin share that takes the entitlements into account.
Let us get back to the case with the equal entitlements. Another way to interpret maxmin share is this: suppose that we ask agent ai to fairly distribute the items in M between n agents of N , based on his own valuation function. In an ideal situation (e.g., if the goods are completely divisible), we expect ai to allocate a share with value Vi(M)/n to every agent. However, since the goods are indivisible, some sort of unfairness is inevitable. For this case, we wish that ai does his best to retain fairness. MMSi is in fact, a parameter that reveals how much fairness ai can guarantee, regarding his valuation function.
Formally, to measure the fairness of an allocation by ai, define a value F i A for any allocation A = A1, A2, . . . , An as
In fact, we wish to make sure ai reports an allocation A * such that F i A * is as close to 1 as possible. The maxmin share of ai is therefore defined as
It is easy to observe that Equations (1) and (2) are equivalent, since the fairest allocation in the absence of different entitlements is an allocation that maximizes value of the minimum bundle:
Now, consider the case with different entitlements. Let ei be the entitlement of agent ai. Similar to the second interpretation for MMSi, ask agent ai to fairly distribute the items between the agents, but this time, considers the entitlements. In an ideal situation (e.g., a completely divisible resource), we expect the allocation to be proportional to the entitlements, i.e. ai allocates a share to agent aj with value exactly Vi(M)ej (note that when the entitlements are equal, this value equals to Vi(M)/n for every agent). But again, such an ideal situation is very rare to happen and thus we allow some unfairness. In the same way, define the fairness of an allocation A = A1, A2, . . . , An as
. . , A * n be an allocation by ai that maximizes F i A * . The weighted maxmin share of agent ai is defined in the same way as MMSi, that is:
In summery, the value WMMSi for every agent ai is defined as follows:
Vi(Aj) ei ej .
For more intuition, consider the following example:
Example 1. Assume that we have two agents a1, a2 with e1 = 1/3 and e2 = 2/3. Furthermore, suppose that there are 5 items b1, b2, b3, b4, b5 with the following valuations for a1:
Thus, A ′ is a fairer allocation than A. In addition, A ′ is the fairest possible allocation and hence, WMMS1 = 1 · 24 · 1/3 = 8.
Example 1 also gives an insight about why agent duplication (as introduced in the Introduction) is not a good idea. For this example, if we duplicate agent a2, we have three agents with the same entitlements. But any partitioning of the items into three bundles, results in a bundle with value at most 7 to a1.
Finally, an allocation of the items in M to the agents in N is said to be α − WMMS, if the total value of the share allocated to each agent ai is worth at least αWMMSi to him.
A TIGHT 1/N BOUND ON THE OPTIMAL ALLOCATION
In spite of the fact that there exists a 2/3-WMMS guarantee when all the entitlements are equal, in our general setting surprisingly we provide a counterexample which proves that there is no guarantee better than 1/n-WMMS. We complement this result by showing that a 1/n-WMMS always exists. Thus, these two theorems make a tight bound for the problem.
The main property of our counterexample is a large gap between the value of items for different agents. We provide a counterexample according to this property in Theorem 2.1.
Theorem 2.1. There exists no guarantee better than 1/n-WMMS when the entitlements to the items may differ.
Proof. We propose an example that admits no allocation better than 1/n-WMMS. To this end, consider an instance with n agents and 2n − 1 items and let ei = ǫ for all i < n and en = 1 − (n − 1)ǫ. The valuation functions of the first n−1 agents are the same. For every agent ai with 1 ≤ i < n, Vi({bj }) is as follows:
Also, for agent an we have:
First, note that WMMSi = ǫ for the first n − 1 agents and WMMSn = 1 − (n − 1)ǫ. For the first n − 1 agents, the optimal partitioning is to allocate bi to ai for all i ≤ n. Furthermore, the optimal partitioning for an is to allocate items bn+1, bn+2, . . . , b2n−1 to the first n − 1 agents and keep the first n items for himself. In this case, Vn({b1, b2, ..., bn}) = 1 − (n − 1)ǫ, and Vn({bn+i}) = ǫ for 1 ≤ i < n. Therefore,
On the other hand, in any allocation that guarantees a non-zero fraction of WMMS for every agent, at most one of the items b1, b2, . . . , bn is allocated to an, since the rest of the items have value 0 for the first n − 1 agents. Therefore, the items allocated to an are worth at most
to him. Thus, the best fraction of WMMS that can be guaranteed is
Equation (4) can be made arbitrarily close to 1/n, by choosing sufficiently small ǫ. Thus, no allocation can guarantee an approximation better than 1/n for this example. ✷ Theorem 2.1 gives a 1/n-WMMS upper-bound. In Theorem 2.2, we show that the provided upper-bound is tight. Algorithm 1 uses a simple greedy procedure, which is spiritually similar to an algorithm in [1] , guaranteeing 1/n-WMMS allocation as follow: sort the agents in descending order of entitlements. Starting from the first agent, ask every person to collect the most valuable item from the remaining set, one by one. Repeat the process until no more item is left. Proof. If the number of items is smaller than the number of agents then the proof is trivial. Therefore, from this point on, we assume m ≥ n. Without loss of generality we assume agents are sorted in descending order of their entitlements, that is e1 ≥ e2 . . . ≥ en. The goal is to prove that for each agent ai he receives at least 1/n-WMMSi using Algorithm 1. Suppose that the optimal allocation for ai is B * = B * 1 , . . . , B * n . Without loss of generality suppose items are sorted according to their value for ai in descending order that is:
We call items b1, b2, . . . , and bi−1 heavy items for ai. Let H be the set of heavy items for ai. Since the entitlements of agents are sorted from a1 to an, for agents aj and a j ′ when ej > e j ′ we have: The l-th assigned item to ai by the algorithm is not worth less than Vi({b (l−1)n+i }). Hence, the assigned items to ai is worth at least Vi({bi}) + Vi({bn+i}) + Vi({b2n+i}) + . . . for him which is not less than Vi(M \ H)/n ≥ Vi(B * i )/n ≥ 1/n-WMMSi. ✷
ALLOCATION FOR THE RESTRICTED CASE
In Section 2, we gave a tight 1/n-WMMS guarantee for the fair allocation problem with unequal entitlements . In this section, we consider a reasonable restriction of the problem which gives a 1/2-WMMS guarantee. In this restricted setting the value of each item bj to each agent ai is no more than WMMSi. Observation 3.1 shows that how this assumption can be invaluable. Assign item bj to agent ai Observation 3.1. If Vi(bj) ≥ WMMSi, it is in the best interest of ai to report his valuation for bj equal to infinity. Because his WMMS may increase in this way, and he achieves more items after the allocation of the algorithm, because his WMMS may increase in this way, and he will be satisfied even if he receives only this item.
In this section, we provide an algorithm with 1/2-WMMS guarantee for the restricted case of the problem. For a case that the entitlements are equal, an algorithm, namely bag filling guarantees 1/2-WMMS for all the agents. In the bag filling algorithm, we start with an empty bag. In each step, we add a remaining item to the bag. After each addition, if the total value of items in the bag becomes more than 1/2-WMMSi for an unsatisfied agent ai, we allocate all the items in the bag to him and repeat the procedure with an empty bag. After running this simple procedure, each agent ai receives at least 1/2-WMMSi.
Our algorithm allocates the items to agents in a more clever way. We allocate an item to an agent in each step of the algorithm until each agent ai receives at least 1/2-WMMSi by the allocation. To this end, in each step, first the algorithm for each agent ai creates a candidate set of items where bj is in the candidate set of ai if Vi({bj })/Vi(M)F i A * be the maximum number among all of the unsatisfied agents. Then, the algorithm chooses unsatisfied agent ai and item bj in its candidate set which maximize Vi({bj })/Vi(M)F i A * among all of the unsatisfied agents and items in their candidate sets, and assigns this item to the agent.
Before proving Algorithm 2 guarantees a 1/2-WMMS allocation, we prove an auxiliary lemma which argues that using Algorithm 2 no agent receives more than his WMMS. Proof. The algorithm does not assign anymore items to a satisfied agent. Hence, any satisfied agent ai has less than 1/2-WMMSi value of items in Ai before he receives the last item. For the sake of contradiction, suppose that the algorithm allocates more than WMMSi to ai. Without loss of generality, suppose that the last item allocated to ai is bj. Since before allocating bj to ai he had less than 1/2-WMMSi value of items in Ai, the value of bj to ai is more than 1/2-WMMSi. Since Vi(bj ) ≤ WMMSi, before allocating bj to ai we have Ai = ∅. Since Vi(bj) is more than the value of all the other allocated items to ai, bj was not in the candidate set of ai when we were assigning the other items to ai. Hence, bj was in the candidate set of an other agent a i ′ . Therefore,
Since this value is greater than the values of all other items in Ai, the algorithm first allocate bj to unsatisfied agent a i ′ . ✷ Now, using Lemma 3.1, we prove the approximation guarantee of the algorithm. Proof. It is clear that if the algorithm satisfies all the agents, it ensures the approximation guarantee. Now, for the sake of contradiction assume that there exists an unsatisfied agent ai at the end of the algorithm. For each item bj we define
where a i ′ is the recipient of bj in the allocation. Since v ′ b j is maximal according to the algorithm, and ai is not a satisfied agent, we have:
Lemma 3.1 implies that b j v ′ b j ≤ 1, and since we have at least one unsatisfied agent we can write:
Inequality (6) along with Inequality (7) 
EMPIRICAL RESULTS
As we discussed in Section 2, in extreme cases, making a WMMS allocation or even an approximately WMMS allocation is theoretically impossible. However, our counterexample is extremely delicate and thus very unlikely to happen in real-world. Here, we show in practice fair allocations w.h.p exist, especially when the number of items is large.
We draw the valuation of the agents for the goods based on a collection of bids for eBay items publicly available at http://cims.nyu.edu/ munoz/data/. More precisely, for m items, we randomly choose m different categories of goods from the dataset. Moreover, for every agent ai and item bj , we set Vi({bj}) to a submitted bid for the corresponding category of item bj chosen uniformly at random. The bids vary from 0.01 to 113.63 and their mean is 6.57901. Moreover, the expected variance of the bids in every category is 200.513.
For an instance of the problem with n agents and m items, we run the experiments with 1000 different vector of entitlements drawn from the uniform distribution (and scaled up to satisfy ei = 1). For every n and m, we take the minimum WMMS guarantee obtained all 1000 runs, and show The horizontal line shows the number of items varying from n to n 2 . Blue, red, and yellow polylines illustrate the performance of our algorithm for n = 10, n = 50, and n = 200 respectively. it in Figures 1 and 2 . We used heuristic algorithms to compute the maxmin shares and maxmin guarantees. Thus, our results are only lower bounds to the actual WMMS guarantees. Nonetheless, the optimal guarantees are very close to the estimated ones. Figures 1 and 2 illustrate the result of the runs for n = 10, n = 50, and n = 200 respectively. Figure 1 only depicts the WMMS guarantees for m ∈ [n, 2n] whereas in Figure 2 the number of items varies from n to n 2 .
As shown in Figures 1 and 2 , the approximation guarantee improves as we increase the number of items. Moreover, unless m is very close to n, a WMMS allocation exists in our experiments (notice that the guarantee is above 1 when m is considerably larger that n).
STOCHASTIC SETTING
In Section 2 we presented a counterexample to show that no allocation better than 1/n-WMMS can be guaranteed. However, the construction described in the counterexample is very unlikely to happen in the real settings. Here, we show that WMMS allocation exists with high probability when a small randomness is allowed in the setting.
Considering stochastic settings is common in the fair allocation problems since many real-world instances can be modeled with random distributions [5, 13, 1, 10] . The general probabilistic model used in previous works is as follows: every agent ai has a probability distribution Di over [0, 1] and for every item bj , the value for Vi({bj }) is randomly sampled from Di. In [1] , the existence of an MMS allocation is proved for the special case of Di = U (0, 1), where U (0, 1) is the standard uniform distribution with minimum 0 and maximum 1. Kurokawa, Procaccia, and Wang [13] considered the problem for arbitrary random distribution Di with the condition that V[Di] ≥ c for a positive constant c. A considerable part of the proof for the existence of an MMS allocation in [13] is referred to [10] , where the authors proved the existence of an envy-free allocation in the stochastic settings with arbitrary random distributions.
In this section, we consider two different probabilistic models. Our first model is the same as [13] , with the exception that we omit the restriction V[Di] ≥ c. We name this model as Stochastic Agents model. In the second model, every item bi has a probability distribution Di and for every agent aj, value of Vj({bi}) is randomly drawn from Di. We choose the name Stochastic Items for the second model. We believe that Stochastic Items model is more realistic since the first model does not make any distinguish between the items. None of the previous works mentioned above considered this model.
We leverage Hoeffding inequality to prove the existence of WMMS allocation. Theorem 5.1 states the general form of this inequality [12] .
Theorem 5.1 (General Form of Hoeffding (1963) ). Let X1, X2, . . . , Xn be random variables bounded by the interval [0, 1] : 0 ≤ Xi ≤ 1. We define the empirical mean of these variables byX = 1 n (X1 + X2 + . . . + Xn). Then, the following inequality holds:
Regarding Theorem 5.1, let X = nX = i Xi and let µ = n × E(X). By Inequality (9), we have:
By setting nt = δµ, we rewrite Equation (10) as:
Model I: Stochastic Agents
As mentioned before, in the first model we assume that every agent has a probability distribution Di and for every item bj , the value of Vi({bj }) is randomly sampled from Di. Furthermore, we suppose µi = E(Di). Throughout this section, we assume that m ≥ n. This is w.l.o.g , because for the case m < n, WMMSi for every agent ai equals to zero. For the Stochastic Agents model, we state Theorem 5.2.
Theorem 5.2. Consider an instance of the fair allocation problem with unequal entitlements, such that the value of every item for every agent ai is randomly drawn from distribution Di. Furthermore, let s = mini si and µ = mini µi. Then, for every 0 < ǫ < 1, there exists a value
such that if m ≥ m ′ , then almost surely a (1 − ǫ)-WMMS allocation exists.
In the rest of this section, we prove Theorem 5.2. Consider the algorithm that allocates ti = ⌊mei⌋ items to every agent ai. We know that the value of item bi for agent aj is randomly sampled from Di. From the point of view of the algorithm, it trivially does not matter whether the value of items are sampled after the allocation or before the allocation. Thus, we can suppose that the value of every item is sampled after the allocation of items.
For now, we know that ti = ⌊mei⌋ number of items are assigned to ai. Argue that for every ǫ > 0, there exists a value m ′ , such that for every m ≥ m ′ , ti ≥ mei(1 − ǫ). In Lemma 5.3 we bound the value of m ′ in terms of ei and ǫ.
. This, completes the proof. ✷
For the rest of the proof, suppose that m > 1 ǫe i . Let Xi be the variable indicating total value of items allocated to ai. Note that E(Xi) = tiµi. Regarding Equation (11), we have:
We want to choose δ such that P(|Xi − tiµi| ≥ δtiµi) ≤ 1 2mn . We have:
Regarding the facts that ti ≥ mei(1 − ǫ) and m ≥ n, we have:
ti ln 4mn 2(tiµi) 2 ≤ ln 2 + ln m eimµi 2 (1 − ǫ) Therefore, it's enough to choose δ such that
Now, let t ′ i be the number of items that are not assigned to ai. Since ti + t ′ i = m, regarding the fact that ti ≥ mei(1 − ǫ), ei) . Also, let X ′ i be the variable indicating total value of the items that are not allocated to ai. By the same deduction as ti for t ′ i we have:
Thus, it's enough to choose δ in a way that Inequality (13) holds. Regarding the facts that m > n and t ′ i ≥ m(1 − ei),
Therefore, it's enough to choose δ ′ in a way that
Now, suppose that both Inequalities (12) and (14) are held. Considering Si as the set of items assigned to ai, with the probability of at least 1 − ( 1 2mn + 1 2mn ) = 1 − 1 mn we have:
i µi It is easy to show that, there always exist an m ′ i such that for all m ≥ m ′ i both Inequalities (12) and (14) hold for δ = ǫ and δ ′ = ǫ. Regarding this, we have:
Therefore, with the probability at least 1 − 1 mn we have:
Now, suppose that the Inequality 15 holds for every agent ai, with probability at least 1 − 1 mn . Considering all the agents, with the probability at least ( 
for every agent ai is at least ei(1 − 3ǫ). Regarding the fact that WMMSi ≤ eiVi(M), we have
This completes the proof.
Model II: Stochastic Items
As mentioned, in Stochastic Items model, every item bi has a probability distribution Di and the value of every agent aj for item bi is randomly chosen from Di. For this model, we prove Theorem 5.4. The theorem states that for large enough m, almost surely a (1 − ǫ)-WMMS allocation exists. In the rest of the section, we prove Theorem 5.4. First, in Lemma 5.6 we prove the existence of an allocation that assigns to every agent ai, a set of items with value at least WMMSi − Mi, where Mi = maxj (Vi({bj})). The idea to prove this fact is inspired by [2] . Argue that we can formulate the allocation problem with unequal entitlements as the following Integer program:
In IP (16) , variable fi,j determines whether bj is assigned to agent ai or not. Considering the fact that Vi(M) · ei is a trivial upper bound on WMMSi, any solution to IP16 is a feasible solution to the assignment problem with unequal entitlements. By relaxing the second and the third condition, we can convert IP16 to LP17:
For every feasible solution A to LP17, we construct the bipartite graph GA I, J, E where I = {1, 2, ..., n} and J = {1, 2, .., m} correspond to the set of players and items, respectively. An edge i, j is included if fi,j > 0. Then by the same way used by [2] , we will prove the following theorem.
Lemma 5.5. There exists a solution A ′ to LP17, such that GA is a pseudoforest. (each component of the graph is either a tree or a tree with an extra edge)
Proof. We have mn + m + n inequalities defining the polytope of feasible solutions of LP17. We have mn variables fi,j , therefore every solution which is located in the corner of polytope satisfies at least mn inequalities as equalities and there will be at most m + n non-zero variables in these solutions. By the same method used by [2] , it is clear to show that if A ′ is corresponding solution to a corner of polytope, then G A ′ is a pseudoforest. ✷
We call the solution with the property defined in Lemma 5.5 as constrained solution. In [2] it is shown that every constrained solution for LP17, can be converted to a solution for IP16, such that every agent ai loses at most one item bj where fi,j > 0.
Lemma 5.6. There exists an allocation in which every agent ai gets at least WMMSi − maxj Vi({bj }).
Proof. The polytope of of feasible solutions of LP17 is non-empty, because it has at least one solution which is, fi,j = 1 ei for every agent ai and item bj. Therefore there exists a constrained solution for LP17, and using the same method in [2] this solution can be converted to a solution for IP16, such that every agent loses at most one item. ✷ , then for every item b k and every agent aj, we assign this item to this agent with the probability ej. Let X j,k be a random variable that takes the value Vi({b k }) with the probability ej and 0 otherwise. We have E[X j,k ] > c ej
Proofs
. Let Xj = m k=1 X j,k . By setting nt = γ, we rewrite Equation (10) 
